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Abstract. We analyze the effects of a generalized class of negative consump-
tion externalities (asymmetric and non-atmospheric) on the structure of efficient
commodity tax programs. Households are not only concerned about consumption
reference levels — that is, they gain utility from “keeping up with the Joneses” —
they also exhibit altruism. Two sets of efficient tax regimes are compared, based,
on a welfarist- and a non-welfarist optimality criterion, respectively. Altruism turns
out not to be at odds with the consumption externalities. Rather, altruism impli-
cates a bound on efficient utility allocations. A non-welfarist government tolerates
less inequality than a welfarist one. In the welfarist (non-welfarist) case, first-best
personalized commodity tax rates respond highly sensitively (barely) to whether or
not a consumption externality is asymmetric or non-atmospheric. If personalized
commodity tax rates are not available (second-best case), the tax rate on a non-
positional good is typically different from zero for corrective reasons. For plausible
functional forms and parameter values, numerical simulations suggest that second-
best tax rates are rather insensitive with respect to both the optimality criterion
and the “nature” of the consumption externality.
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Since ... appearance tyrannizes over truth and is lord of happiness, to
appearance I must devote myself.
. — Plato, The Republic (Book II)
1 Introduction
This paper addresses the effects of a generalized class of negative consumption exter-
nalities (asymmetric and non-atmospheric) on the structure of efficient commodity
taxation in a framework with both a positional and a non-positional commodity.
That is, individual utility is not independent of other individuals’ consumption. In
fact, households form consumption reference levels, a fact well established in the
literature (cf. the discussion below). Consumption reference levels give rise to a
consumption externality. This externality is often referred to as a keeping up with
the Joneses externality.1
In contrast to the prior literature, the present analysis takes three important
facts into account. First, some people typically contribute more to a consumption
reference level than others. In this case, we refer to the consumption externality
as a non-atmospheric one. In other words, not every household belongs to one’s
consumption reference group (to the same degree).2 In contrast, a consumption ex-
ternality is termed atmospheric if consumption of the positional commodity of any
two households are perfect substitutes regarding the generation of one’s consump-
tion reference level. Second, consider the reference groups of two given households.
Consumption of a member of both reference groups may exert different (asymmet-
ric) effects on these two household’s consumption reference levels — a situation
we refer to as an asymmetric consumption externality. Third, households are not
only concerned about consumption reference levels, they also exhibit altruism (cf.
Johansson 1997).
This paper is motivated by the recent literature on consumption externalities
and happiness. Psychologists and behavioral economists have established that indi-
1Different authors employ various terms, with slightly varying meanings. These terms in-
clude (negative) consumption externality, positional-, status-, relative consumption, jealousy, envy,
catching up with the Joneses. As made precise below, we focus on the case of keeping up with the
Joneses in this paper.
2For example, sometimes I see my neighbor next door drinking Nespresso. Other times, on
TV, I see George Clooney drinking Nespresso. For some reason, one impresses me more than the
other.
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viduals experience happiness by doing well relative to some reference group (Brekke
and Howarth 2002, Easterlin 1995, Frank 1985, 1999). Important survey experi-
mental studies substantiating this evidence include Johansson-Stenman et al. (2002,
2006), and Solnick and Hemenway (1998, 2005).3 The main response of economic
theory to this evidence has regularly consisted in allowing for a uniform consump-
tion reference term — commonly the economy’s average consumption — in the
utility functions of households. While consideration of the consumption reference
level in an otherwise standard framework has delivered important insights4, the
usual specification of “the” reference level still exhibits two major shortcomings.
The first shortcoming refers to a household’s reference group(s). There may
be different reference groups, and even within a reference group, some individuals
may be considered more influential than others. For example, Cowan et al. (2004)
argue that some activities become more desirable when they can be shared with a
group of peers (peer group effect). Other activities become more desirable if they
allow the consumer to emulate the consumption of an elite group that he or she
aspires to join (aspiration effect). Still other activities become more desirable when
the individual can, through wealth or personal endowments, out-shine its peers
(distinction effect). In the jargon adopted in this paper, within a reference group, a
household may be more concerned with some individuals rather than with others.
That is, a consumption externality is usually non-atmospheric. In addition, the
consumption of a given household might matter more for some individuals than for
others, that is, a consumption externality commonly is asymmetric. Put differently,
even if two households are concerned with the same reference group, this does not
imply that these households also share the same consumption reference level.
The second shortcoming refers to the fact that households not only care about
consumption reference levels but also about inequality or redistribution (Brekke and
Howarth 2002). As has been shown, individuals dislike being “too different” from
their peers. Fehr and Schmidt (1999), find that people dislike income inequality,
3A large number of further empirical studies add significant evidence. Cf. Alpizar et al. (2005),
Alvarez-Cuadrado et al. (2012), Carlsson et al. (2007), Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005), Luttmer (2005),
Maurer et al. (2008), McBride (2001), Neumark et al. (1998), and Ravina (2007).
4Consumption externalities have shed light for example on the analysis of renewable resource
extraction (Alvarez-Cuadrado and Van Long, 2011), envy and inequality (Van Long and Alvarez-
Cuadrado, forthcoming), happiness (Easterlin 1995, Frank 1985, Frank 1999, Scitovsky 1992),
economic growth (Brekke and Howarth 2002, Carroll et al. 1997, Liu and Turnovsky 2005), or
asset pricing (Abel 1999, Campbell and Cochrane 1999, Dupor and Liu 2003).
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but they are more upset when their own income falls short than they are pleased
by an excess in comparison to their reference levels.
In this paper, we take both of these shortcomings into account for the derivation
of efficient tax programs under both a welfarist and a non-welfarist government. A
welfarist government fully respects individual preferences in the formulation of the
welfare criterion. On the other hand, a non-welfarist government does not tolerate
status preferences — those are basically a form of envy — to be part of the welfare
criterion.5 That is, in the non-welfarist case the government’s and individuals’
preferences differ. Our analysis sheds light on the optimal policies that emerge
from these two different welfare criteria.
This paper is related to the prior literature on optimal taxation and consumption
externalities (see, e.g., Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman 2008 and 2010, Boskin and
Sheshinski 1978, Layard 1980, Ljungqvist and Uhlig 2000). From this literature it
is well established that an externality due to relative consumption concerns calls for
some corrective element in the tax system. For example, Aronsson and Johansson-
Stenman (2008) show that the presence of a keeping up with the Joneses externality
implies substantially higher marginal income tax rates. The issue of a consumption
externality being non-atmospheric rather than atmospheric has also already been
taken up by Eckerstorfer (2013), Micheletto (2008) and Wendner (2013). From these
studies it has become evident that the nature of a consumption externality indeed
matters for the optimal tax structure. However, this literature does not consider
asymmetric consumption externalities. Our paper is also related to the literature
that studies optimal tax policy from the perspective of a non-welfarist government
(see, e.g., Besley 1988, Blomquist and Micheletto 2006, O’Donoghue and Rabin
2006). These studies are concerned with the taxation of sin goods and (de)merit
goods where the government does not fully respect households’ preferences.
This paper explicates four results. First, efficient welfarist first-best tax rates on
the positional good are personalized and directly depend on the specific features of
the non-atmospheric and asymmetric consumption externality. Specifically, house-
holds contributing more than others to the generation of the consumption exter-
nality face a higher first-best tax rate. However, in the non-welfarist case, efficient
first-best tax rates directly depend on the specific features of the consumption exter-
5For example, Harsanyi (1982) claims that antisocial preferences such as envy or jealousy should
not be allowed to be part of a social welfare function.
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nality only if the consumption reference level does have an impact on the marginal
rate of substitution of the positional good for leisure. Second, if the consump-
tion externality is non-atmospheric, the efficient corrective second-best tax rate on
the non-positional good is generally different from zero, once a personalized tax
on the positional good is not available. Third numerical simulations reveal that
the first-best tax rates are highly sensitive with respect to the specific features of
the consumption externality. In contrast, the second-best tax rates barely respond
to the specific features of the consumption externality. Moreover, the second-best
corrective tax rate on the non-positional good turns out to be quite low. Fourth,
altruism and keeping up with the Joneses preferences are not contrasting motives
— even if the consumption externality is non-atmospheric or asymmetric. Rather,
altruism requires the distribution of utility not to bee too unequal, in a well-defined
sense. It imposes a fairness condition which narrows the set of efficient allocations
to those that are not too distant from an egalitarian allocation. The specific set of
fair allocations is strongly affected by the features of the consumption externality.
More inequality is tolerated towards households contributing more than others to
the generation of the consumption externality. Moreover, for a given consumption
externality, the set of fair allocations under a non-welfarist government is smaller
than that under a welfarist government. A non-welfarist government tolerates less
inequality compared to a welfarist government.
To sum up, the nature (non-atmospheric, asymmetric) of the consumption ex-
ternality exhibits a strong impact on first-best commodity tax rates as well as on
fair efficient utility allocations. While this is potentially also true in the second-
best, numerical simulations reveal that second-best tax rates are rather insensitive
with respect to both the optimality criterion and the “nature” of the consump-
tion externality. Altruism has no offsetting effect on the corrective elements in the
tax system induced by the presence of status effects. However, altruism implies a
fairness condition which requires the efficient distribution of utility not to be too
unequal.
Section 2 of this paper presents the economy and defines non-atmospheric and
asymmetric consumption externalities as well as the type of altruism adopted. It
also characterizes a welfarist efficient first-best tax program. Section 3 discusses
both a welfarist efficient second-best tax program (with uniform tax rates) and the
4
impact of altruism on “fair” (utility) allocations. Section 4 considers efficient first-
and second-best tax programs under a non-welfarist government. The efficient tax
rates differ between the welfarist- and non-welfarist optimality criteria. Therefore,
Section 5 presents numerical simulations in order to give a rough indication of the
magnitude of the differences in efficient tax rates between the welfarist- and non-
welfarist cases. Section 6 concludes the paper. The appendix contains proofs and
mathematical results that support the analysis of the main text.
2 The model
We consider a static economy with n households. A household i ∈ N = {1, ..., n}
has preferences over two private goods xi and zi, leisure li and a reference consump-
tion level zi. In addition, households derive utility from the average utility of all
households in the economy. We consider spending on x as a nonpositional form of
consumption and spending on z as status consumption, i.e. for good z households
care about their relative consumption with respect to others. Households differ in
their exogenous earning ability wi and in their preferences. The preferences of a
household are represented by the concave utility function
ui(xi, zi, li, zi) +
ϕ
n
n∑
j=1
uj(xj, zj, lj, zj), (1)
where ϕ ≥ 0 is a weighting factor which is assumed to be constant across house-
holds. Utility of a household i increases in own private consumption and leisure and
decreases in the reference level zi. Further, similarly to Brekke and Howarth (2002)
utility of a household increases with the average utility of the whole population, i.e.
households are altruistic as they also derive satisfaction from the general welfare
in the economy.6 The strength of altruism is reflected by ϕ. Both the reference
level and the average utility of all households are considered to be exogenous by a
household.7
The consumption reference level zi gives rise to a negative consumption exter-
nality. In this paper, we focus on the case of a keeping up with the Joneses (KUJ-)
externality. Dupor and Liu (2003) define preferences exhibiting a KUJ externality
6Johansson (1997) refers to this form of altruism as genuine altruism.
7Intuitively a household considers her own contribution to the reference level and to the average
utility in the population as extremely small and therefore negligible.
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by ∂(uz/ul)/∂z > 0.
8 That is, we assume that the marginal utility of consuming
the status good relative to that of leisure increases in the reference level.
Let the reference level of a household i concerning consumption of good z be
determined by
zi =
1
n
n∑
j=1
aijzj. (2)
with i, j ∈ N . The nonnegative coefficient aij indicates the amount by which
the consumption of one unit of the status good, z, by the externality-generating
household j raises the consumption reference level of household i. Thus, regarding
the composition of zi, the second index of coefficients aij refers to the household of
origin of the consumption externality, and the first index of coefficients aij refers to
the household of destination of the consumption externality. If aij = 1 for all i, j ∈
N the reference level is equal to the economy’s mean consumption of the status good.
However, in general these weights differ between different households of origin (aij 6=
aij′ with i, j, j
′ ∈ N and j 6= j′) and between different households of destination
(aij 6= ai′j with i, i′, j ∈ N and i 6= i′). This gives rise to two forms of heterogeneities
in the reference level. First, if weights differ between households of origin a given
consumption quantity of some households contributes more to the consumption
reference levels than the same consumption quantity of other households. Second,
if weights differ between households of destination, different households, in general,
have different reference levels.
We say that an externality is of the atmospheric type if weights are constant
across all households of origin. In contrast, if weights differ across households of
origin, then the externality is said to be of the non-atmospheric type.
Definition 1 (Non-atmospheric consumption externality)
An externality is said to be non-atmospheric if aij 6= aij′ for some i, j, j′ ∈ N with
j 6= j′. Otherwise it is atmospheric.
If an externality is non-atmospheric, the status consumption (zj, zj′) of households
j and j′ are not perfect substitutes regarding the generation of zi. Assume that
NH ⊂ N represents the set of all households with a “high” social status. If the
reference consumption levels depend only on the consumption of members of this
8We use subscripts to denote partial derivatives with respect to the subscripted variable, that
is uz = ∂u/∂z. Subscripts i, j refer to households (rather than being partial derivatives).
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group, then aij > 0 if j ∈ NH and aij = 0 if j /∈ NH for all i ∈ N .
We say that an externality is symmetric if weights are constant across households of
destination. In contrast, we say that an externality is asymmetric if weights differ
between households of destination.
Definition 2 (Asymmetric consumption externality)
An externality is said to be asymmetric if aij 6= ai′j for some i, i′, j ∈ N with i 6= i′.
Otherwise, it is symmetric.
As long as aij = ai′j for all i, i
′, j ∈ N , zi = zi′ . That is, as long as the externality
is symmetric, there is a unique reference level for the whole population. Only if
the externality is asymmetric, households have different reference levels, no matter
whether the externality is non-atmospheric or not:
Lemma 1 (Asymmetric and non-atmospheric consumption externality)
An asymmetric consumption externality implies personalized consumption reference
levels, irrespective of whether the consumption externality is of the non-atmospheric
type or not.
There is a linear technology for the production of private goods with labor as the
only input. Quantities of goods are chosen such that the (constant) marginal costs
of production are equal to one for all commodities. Given competitive markets, the
producer prices of both commodities equal one and the wage rate of a household i
equals productivity wi. The time endowment of a household is normalized to one
and is divided between labor and leisure. Hence, the labor income of a household
is given by wi(1− li).
2.1 The household’s maximization problem
In a first step, we characterize consumer behavior given competitive markets. House-
holds maximize their utility subject to the private budget constraint
qxxi + qzzi ≤ wi(1− li) + τi, (3)
where qx = 1+ tx and qz = 1+ tz are consumer prices and τi is a lump-sum transfer.
The tax instruments of the government consist of proportional commodity taxes tx
7
and tz and a lump-sum element τi.
9 Labor income is left untaxed without loss of
generality.
Households choose consumption and leisure such that the following necessary
conditions hold:
−MRSizx =
1 + tz
1 + tx
, (4)
−MRSilx =
wi
1 + tx
, (5)
with MRSkx ≡ −uk/ux and k ∈ {z, l}. Households choose x, z, l so as to equalize
their marginal rates of substitution to relative prices. Observe that the altruism
parameter ϕ does not appear in these optimality conditions, i.e. the presence of
altruism has no effect on the consumption and leisure decision of a household. A
household’s indirect utility function is given by
vi(qx, qz, τi, zi) +
ϕ
n
n∑
j=1
vj(qx, qz, τj, zj). (6)
It is the maximum utility a household i can obtain, given consumer prices, the
lump-sum transfer and the reference level. Observe that due to the presence of
altruism the indirect utility of household i also depends on the lump-sum element
and reference level of all other households.
2.2 Characterization of a first-best allocation
In this subsection we characterize first-best allocations for this economy and analyze
which tax instruments are required to implement these allocations. Assume that a
social planner can directly determine xi, zi, li for each household i. Then a Pareto
efficient first-best allocation is a solution to the following problem:
max
xi,zi,li,zi,i=1,...,n
u1(x1, z1, l1, z1) +
ϕ
n
n∑
j=1
uj(xj, zj, lj, zj) (7)
9In first-best we allow the tax rate on the status good to vary across households, i.e. we allow
for personalized commodity taxes tz,i, and hence, for personalized consumer prices qz,i.
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subject to
ui(xi, zi, li, zi) +
ϕ
n
n∑
j=1
uj(xj, zj, lj, zj) ≥ ui i = 2, ..., n (µFBi ) (8)
n∑
i=1
xi +
n∑
i=1
zi =
n∑
i=1
wi(1− li) (λFB) (9)
zi =
1
n
n∑
j=1
aijzj i = 1, ..., n (γ
FB
i ) (10)
where ui is some minimum utility requirement for household i. Lagrange multipliers
are given within parenthesis and the index FB refers to first-best. By varying the
minimum utility requirement ui the family of Pareto efficient allocations can be
characterized. In the Appendix we show that for an interior solution the following
conditions hold:
−MRSizx = 1 +
1
n
∑n
j=1 γ
FB
j aji
λFB︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ψi
(11)
−MRSilx = wi (12)
1 + ϕ
ϕ
≥ 1
n
n∑
j=1
∂ui/∂xi
∂uj/∂xj
(13)
for i = 1, ..., n. Equations (11) and (12) state conditions for an efficient allocation
of consumption goods and leisure. Equation (13) is a fairness condition that puts
a limit on the set of allocations consistent with the Pareto criterion.
The second term on the right-hand side of equation (11), which we call Ψi,
represents a correction term that arises due to the existence of the status externality.
It can be interpreted as the social harm that is caused by an additional unit of status
good consumption of household i. It is strictly positive as utility decreases with an
increase in the reference level.10 Observe that if the externality is non-atmospheric
Ψi differs between (some) households, i.e. Ψi 6= Ψi′ if aji 6= aji′ for j, i, i′ ∈ N and
i 6= i′. Then, intuitively, status consumption of some households is at the margin
socially more harmful than that of other households. Only if the externality is
atmospheric Ψi is constant across households.
11
10It follows immediately from (55) that then each γFBj is strictly positive in the optimum.
11Note that even in this case households have different reference levels if the externality is
asymmetric.
9
The fairness condition in equation (13) shrinks the set of fair utility allocations.
It is implied by the presence of genuine altruism in the utility function.12 It states
that for an allocation to be Pareto efficient the average ratio of the marginal utility
of consuming good x between household i and all (other) households must not be
too large. This ratio is large if household i consumes relatively little of good x
compared to all other households. In other words the fairness condition rules out
allocations which are too unequal in terms of different marginal utilities of x (and
which would be Pareto efficient with purely egoistic preferences).
In Figure 1 we illustrate the fairness condition if there are only two types of
households.13 One can see that the higher ϕ, the smaller the set of utility allocations
consistent with the fairness condition. Specifically, for ϕ = 5 all utility allocations
on the segment (A,A) are consistent with the fairness condition. With ϕ = 15, only
the smaller segment (B,B) is consistent with the fairness condition. As the strength
of altruism approaches infinity, the left hand side of (13) approaches unity. That is,
∂ui(.)/∂xi = 1, for all i ∈ N . Under strict quasi concavity of the individual utility
functions, only a single utility allocation is consistent with the fairness condition.
As the fairness condition requires equalization of marginal utilities, this singleton
set need not correspond to an egalitarian utility allocation.
j=15
j=5
j=5
A
A
B
B
-1.4 -1.2 -1.0 -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2
u1
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
u2
Figure 1. Fairness condition in first-best; ϕ = 5 vs. ϕ = 15.
12In fact, it can be shown that the existence of such a fairness condition is also implied by the
presence of pure (instead of genuine) altruism in the utility function.
13All figures are based on functional specifications and baseline parameter values that are dis-
cussed in Section 5.
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In the next step, we discuss the tax instruments required for the implementa-
tion of the first-best allocation characterized by equations (11) – (13). That is,
we analyze how the government has to set taxes such that households realize the
efficient allocation as a solution to their maximization problem described above.
There are two reasons why the government wants to impose taxes. First of all, it
wants to redistribute resources since households differ in earning abilities. In ad-
dition, redistribution is also implied by the presence of altruism which limits the
set of allocations considered as fair. As a personalized lump-sum transfer/tax is
available to the government, it can redistribute without distortions. Second, the
government wants to correct for the externalities induced by the consumption of the
status good. For the sake of simplicity we assume that no tax revenues have to be
raised to finance public good expenditures, i.e. taxes are only used to redistribute
resources and to internalize the consumption externalities.
When contrasting conditions (11) and (12) with conditions (4) and (5) describing
the households’ optimality condition, one can see that in general a personalized
commodity tax tz,i in addition to the personalized lump-sum element is required to
implement the first-best allocation as a competitive equilibrium.14 A personalized
commodity tax is required if the externality is non-atmospheric, because in this case
the Ψi differ between households. If the externality is atmospheric, a uniform tax
on status consumption in addition to the lump-sum element suffices to implement a
first-best allocation. Commodity x stays untaxed in first best as the externality can
be fully internalized with tz,i and redistribution can be achieved through τi without
distortion. Proposition 1 summarizes this result.
Proposition 1 (First-best tax structure)
(i) If the externality is atmospheric, then optimal commodity tax rates are given by
a single tax on z, t∗z,i = Ψi = Ψ = t
∗
z and t
∗
x = 0, whether or not the consumption
externality is asymmetric.
(ii) If the externality is non-atmospheric, then optimal commodity tax rates are given
by differentiated taxes on z, t∗z,i = Ψi and t
∗
x = 0, whether or not the consumption
externality is asymmetric.
(iii) The lump-sum element τ ∗i is required for the efficient redistribution of resources.
14The fact that personalized commodity taxes are required to implement a first-best allocation,
when the externalities vary among the individuals causing them, has also been raised by Diamond
(1973) and Green and Sheshinski (1976).
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Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition for this result is that if the externality is non-atmospheric the status
consumption of some households is at the margin socially more harmful than the
consumption of other households. This makes it desirable to tax the status con-
sumption of different types at different rates. On the other hand, if the externality
is atmospheric the consumption of all households is equally harmful at the margin
and a uniform tax rate suffices.
3 Optimal second-best tax system
Personalized commodity taxes are required to implement a first-best allocation, but
they are hardly a feasible policy instrument. Therefore, we now analyze the second-
best optimal tax policy, when commodity taxes are restricted to be uniform across
households. A Pareto efficient second-best tax system is a solution to the following
problem:
max
tx,tz ,τi,zi,i=1,...,n
v1(qx, qz, τ1, z1) +
ϕ
n
n∑
j=1
vj(qx, qz, τj, zj) (14)
subject to
vi(qx, qz, τi, zi) +
ϕ
n
n∑
j=1
vj(qx, qz, τj, zj) ≥ vi i = 2, ..., n (µSBi ) (15)
tx
n∑
i=1
xi + tz
n∑
i=1
zi ≥
n∑
i=1
τi (λ
SB) (16)
zi =
1
n
n∑
j=1
aijzj i = 1, ..., n (γ
SB
i ) (17)
where again vi is some minimum utility requirement for household i. The index
SB for the Lagrange multipliers refers to second-best. We provide the first-order
conditions for this problem in the Appendix.
3.1 Optimal commodity taxes
From the first-order conditions of this maximization problem the optimal commod-
ity tax structure can be derived. To facilitate notation we define
i ≡ 1
n
n∑
j=1
γSBj
λSB
aji. (18)
12
It can be interpreted as the marginal social harm induced by the status consumption
of household i measured in terms of the government’s tax revenues. We assume that
i > 0, i.e. that status consumption is socially harmful.
15
In the Appendix we show that optimal commodity tax rates satisfy(
sxx szx
sxz szz
)(
tx
tz
)
=
(
1
n
∑n
i=1 is
i
zx
1
n
∑n
i=1 is
i
zz
)
, (19)
where compensated price effects are denoted by sizk = ∂z
com
i /∂qk and s
i
xk = ∂x
com
i /∂qk,
k = {z, x}, and the upper bar is used to denote the mean. By applying Cramer’s
rule, (19) yields an implicit solution for the optimal second-best commodity taxes
t∗∗z and t
∗∗
x .
16
Proposition 2 (Second-best commodity tax structure: general case)
The optimal second-best commodity taxes are given by
t∗∗z =
1
n
(sxx
∑n
i=1 is
i
zz − sxz
∑n
i=1 is
i
zx)
szzsxx − szxsxz , (20)
t∗∗x =
1
n
(szz
∑n
i=1 is
i
zx − szx
∑n
i=1 is
i
zz)
szzsxx − szxsxz . (21)
The optimal tax on the status good is strictly positive. The sign of t∗∗x is ambiguous.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Observe that both t∗∗z and t
∗∗
x are used to correct for the status externalities as they
both depend on the correction element i.
17 Thus, the ’additivity property’ derived
by Sandmo (1975) in a model with an atmospheric externality does not apply. The
’additivity property’ states that an externality is best addressed by imposing a tax
directly on the externality-generating good and by leaving the rest of the tax sys-
tem unaffected by the externality.18 In our framework it is optimal to also tax good
15In principle γSBj and by this i could also be negative. For a detailed discussion on the sign
of the Lagrange multiplier of constraint (17) see Eckerstorfer (2013).
16The 2x2 sub-Slutsky matrix of the taxed goods is assumed to be non-singular and negative
semi-definite, i.e. a solution to this system of equations exists and the determinant of this matrix
is strictly positive.
17The optimal tax formulas contain no redistributive component as personalized lump-sum taxes
are available. If lump-sum taxes were restricted to be uniform, t∗∗z and t
∗∗
x would also depend on
a redistributive term. This can be seen from the many-person Ramsey rule which we provide in
the Appendix (equations (64) and (65)).
18It has already been shown by Micheletto (2008) and Eckerstorfer (2013) in Mirrlees-type
models that this result does not hold if the externality is of the non-atmospheric type, as it is the
case in our study. Hence, we confirm this finding for a Ramsey-type optimal tax model.
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x to correct for the externality. The intuition for this result can be described in
the following way. The government would want to tax the status consumption of
different households at different rates. It wants to tax those households at a higher
rate whose consumption is socially more harmful at the margin (see Proposition 1).
But if commodity tax rates are restricted to be uniform across households such dif-
ferential treatment of households is not possible. Therefore, the government wants
to exploit other possibilities to channel the consumption decision of households in
the desired direction, which can be achieved by changing the relative price structure
through t∗∗z and t
∗∗
x .
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Note that the presence of altruism has no impact on optimal commodity tax
rates. This is because the incentive structure of households is not affected by this
form of altruism. Households make their decisions independently of the parameter
ϕ as they consider average utility in the population as given. Thus, genuine altru-
ism has no impact on the optimality conditions for an efficient allocation. It has,
however, distributional consequences and gives rise to a fairness condition which we
discuss in subsection 3.3.
To get a better understanding of the optimal commodity tax structure we now
consider a number of special cases which provide some insights on how the opti-
mal commodity taxes depend on the specific form of the reference level and on
compensated price effects.
Corollary 1 (Second-best commodity tax structure: special cases)
(i) If the externality is atmospheric and symmetric the optimal commodity tax rates
are given by
t∗∗z = t
∗
z = , t
∗∗
x = t
∗
x = 0, (22)
with  ≡ i for all i.
(ii) If the externality is atmospheric and asymmetric optimal commodity tax rates
are given by
t∗∗z = t
∗
z = , t
∗∗
x = t
∗
x = 0, (23)
with  ≡ i for all i.
(iii) If sizx = 0 or s
i
zx = s
i
zz for all i ∈ N and without any restriction on the reference
19A parallel result is due to Sandmo (1976) who finds that there is a case for a tax or subsidy on
related goods in addition to a tax on the externality-generating good when the uses of commodities
in consumption processes generate externalities (rather than their consumption as such).
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levels
t∗∗z =
∑n
i=1 is
i
zz∑n
i=1 s
i
zz
, t∗∗x = 0. (24)
(iv) If sizx = 0 or s
i
zx = s
i
zz for all i ∈ N and only household n is responsible for the
formation of the reference level, such that aij = 0 for j = 1, ..., (n− 1) and aij = n
for j = n then
t∗∗z = n
snzz∑n
i=1 s
i
zz
, t∗∗x = 0. (25)
Optimal commodity taxes in Corollary 1 follow immediately from (20) and (21).
Case (i) refers to a scenario where there is a unique reference level (for example
the average consumption of the status good) while in case (ii) reference levels differ
between households. From cases (i) and (ii) it can be seen that good x needs not
to be taxed in the optimum if the externality is of the atmospheric type, no matter
whether the externality is asymmetric or not. The optimal tax on the status good
is equal to the marginal social harm of status consumption  if the externality is
atmospheric, again no matter whether the externality is asymmetric or not. Note,
however, that the expressions for  differ between cases (i) and (ii) as  depends on
the different values for aij (see (18)). Thus, whether the externality is symmetric
or not has no impact on the optimal commodity tax structure but on the optimal
level of t∗∗z . Further, observe that if the externality is atmospheric a uniform tax
rate on the status good suffices to fully internalize the externality, and, together
with the lump-sum element, a first-best allocation can be reached.
From cases (iii) and (iv) it can be observed that for the optimal commodity tax
structure also the structure of compensated price effects is crucial. Given general
reference levels, imposing a tax on the nonpositional good is not optimal if com-
pensated cross price effects are zero or if the compensated cross price effects are
equal to the own compensated price effect for the status good.20 Then households
respond in such a way to tx that no additional correction of the externality can be
attained. The structure of compensated price effects also has a strong impact on
t∗∗z as can be seen from the reduced tax formulas in (24) and (25). Observe that in
cases (iii) and (iv) the externality is non-atmospheric and, thus, the marginal social
harm of status consumption i differs between households. This implies that the
20Note that in this case sxx > szz which follows from the negative semi-definiteness of the
Slutsky matrix and our assumption that it is non-singular.
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optimal tax rate on the status good is higher if those households whose consumption
is socially more harmful at the margin also have a higher substitution effect due
to a price increase of the status good. This can be seen in particular for case (iv)
where only the consumption of household n is responsible for the status externality.
3.2 Optimal lump-sum taxes
In this subsection we briefly discuss the optimal second-best lump-sum element.
As personalized lump-sum taxes or -transfers are available, redistribution can be
achieved in a non-distortionary way in this economy. In the optimum the social
marginal utility of income is set equal to its marginal cost for all households. This
follows immediately from the first-order condition for τi from problem (14) – (17)
which can be written as
θSBi
λSB
∂vi
∂τi
= MSCi, (26)
with θSBi ≡ µSBi + ϕ/n
∑n
j=1 µ
SB
j and where the marginal social cost of income
(MSCi) is defined by
MSCi ≡ 1− tx∂xi
∂τi
− tz ∂zi
∂τi
+ i
∂zi
∂τi
. (27)
The first three terms on the right-hand side of (27) reflect the budget cost of a
marginal income increase, and the last term denotes the social harm caused by that
income increase due to an increase in status consumption. We now want to find out
whether or not in a second-best tax system the lump-sum transfers are also used to
correct for the externalities. In first-best, the externalities can be fully internalized
by personalized commodity taxes. Then the lump-sum element is not needed for
externality correcting purposes and serves only for the redistribution of income.
However, in the second-best case the externalities can not be fully internalized
due to the restriction that commodity taxes have to be uniform across households.
Then one might suspect that also the lump-sum element is required to correct for
the externalities. Plugging the optimal commodity taxes given by (20) and (21)
into (26) reveals that, in general, a term depending on i, and therefore on the
externality, remains. This implies that the optimal second-best lump-sum element
τ ∗∗i indeed depends on i.
21 The intuition for this result is that t∗∗z might overcorrect
21This is not the case if the externality is atmospheric. Then the externalities can be fully
internalized with t∗∗z alone and a first-best allocation can be reached. In this case MSCi is equal
to one for all households.
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for the status consumption of some households with low i and undercorrect for
the status consumption of other households with high i. The lump-sum element
can then be used to compensate those whose status consumption causes little social
damage (low i) and to extract income from those whose consumption is particularly
harmful (high i).
To illustrate this point, consider case (iv) of Corollary 1, where only the status
consumption of household n causes an externality. In addition assume that there
are no compensated cross price effects. By plugging the expressions for t∗∗z and t
∗∗
x
from (25) into (26) one gets
θSBi
λSB
∂vi
∂τi
= 1− ∂zi
∂τi
(n
snzz∑n
i=1 s
i
zz
− i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆i
. (28)
Observe that i = 0 for all i = 1, ..., n− 1 and n > 0. Thus, ∆i is positive for these
households, while ∆n is negative as s
n
zz/
∑n
i=1 s
i
zz < 1. This implies MSCi < 1
for i = 1, ..., n − 1 und MSCn > 1. As marginal utility of income is decreasing in
income, the externality has a positive impact on the lump-sum element for those
whose consumption does not cause an externality and a negative impact on the
lump-sum element for household n who is responsible for the externality. This is in
accordance with the intuition provided above, that the lump-sum element is used
to compensate those whose consumption is overcorrected by the commodity taxes
and to extract income of those households whose consumption is undercorrected.
Note that this argument only applies if the externality is non-atmospheric. If the
externality is atmospheric it can be fully internalized with tz alone. Then ∆i = 0 for
all i and the government would set τi at its first-best level. Proposition 3 summarizes
this result.
Proposition 3 (Second-best lump-sum element)
(i) If the externality is non-atmospheric then in a second-best tax system also the
lump-sum element τ ∗∗i serves to correct for the externality.
(ii) If the externality is atmospheric then τ ∗∗i = τ
∗
i as the externality can be fully
internalized through t∗∗z = t
∗
z =  alone.
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3.3 Fairness condition
We have shown that the presence of altruism has no impact on the optimal com-
modity tax structure. However, similar to the first-best case, also in second-best
a fairness condition exists which limits the set of allocations consistent with the
Pareto criterion. There exists a set of allocations which would be Pareto efficient
with purely egoistic preferences but which does not satisfy the Pareto criterion if
households are altruistic. Intuitively, at such allocations altruistic households would
prefer to give income away to those with very little income instead of consuming
it on their own. Such a reallocation would make all households better off leading
to a Pareto improvement.22 Since, in our framework there is no mechanism for
households to give money directly to poorer ones, optimal tax policy is affected by
the fairness-condition. In second-best, the fairness condition is given by:
1 + ϕ
ϕ
≥ 1
n
n∑
j=1
∂vi/∂τi
MSCi
∂vj/∂τj
MSCj
(29)
for all i = 1, ..., n. From (29) it can be seen that in second best the average ratio
of marginal utilities of income is weighted by MSCi. The fairness condition (29)
states that for an allocation to be Pareto efficient the average ratio of the marginal
utility of income of household i to that of all other households must not be too
large. Interestingly, in the second best case more inequality towards household i is
tolerated if the marginal social cost of increasing the income of that household is
large. From (27) it can be seen that MSCi increases with the marginal social cost
of status consumption of household i, as given by i. That is, if the status consump-
tion of household i is particularly harmful at the margin, then more inequality is
tolerated with respect to that household.
In Figure 2 we illustrate this point for two types of households. The figure
shows the impact of a consumption externality being non-atmospheric rather than
atmospheric on the set of utility allocations that are consistent with the fairness
condition in second-best. A shift from an atmospheric to a non-atmospheric exter-
nality goes along with a shift in MSCi, as in contrast to an atmospheric externality
22A similar point has been made by Johansson-Stenman (2005) in the context of global en-
vironmental problems and the free-riding problem between countries. He shows that if there is
a rich and a poor country and the rich country is altruistic toward the poor country, the rich
country may still undertake globally efficient abatement investments as it takes utility effects on
poor countries into account.
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a non-atmospheric externality implies that i differs between households. The yel-
low dashed lines indicate the utility possibility frontier and fair allocations (segment
between A and A) for the case of an atmospheric consumption externality. The solid
blue lines show the respective utility allocations for the non-atmospheric consump-
tion externality with aj1 > aj2, j = 1, 2, i.e. the consumption of type 1 is socially
more harmful at the margin (1 > 2).
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In order to gain intuitive understanding of this result (see Figure 2), we consider
the effects of raising aj1 and lowering aj2 — initially starting at aj1 = aj2 = 1. The
slope of the utility possibility frontier is given by the right hand side of (29), with
i = 1. Graphically, the fairness condition, as given by (29), defines upper and lower
bounds of the slope of the utility possibility frontier.
The slope of the Pareto frontier increases when raising aj1 and lowering aj2.
Intuitively, a given redistribution (dτ1 < 0, dτ2 > 0) increases v˜2 by more in case of
the non-atmospheric consumption externality as opposed to the atmospheric one.
In case of the non-atmospheric consumption externality, the redistribution moves
away resources from the main externality generator. As a consequence, z¯i is lowered
for all households.
As the slope of the Pareto frontier increases, the set of allocations satisfying the
fairness condition shifts up and to the left, as depicted in Figure 2. The fairness
condition imposes a requirement on the utility allocation that is very intuitive. As
consumer 1 has become the main generator of a negative consumption externality,
the fairness condition demands a redistribution of lump sum transfers away from
consumer 1 towards consumer 2. In Figure 2, this requirement shows up as a shift
of the segment of fair utility allocations towards northeast.
23Clearly, with the externality being different in the two cases, the utility possibility frontier is
different as well.
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Figure 2. Fariness conditions in second-best: atmospheric vs. non-atmospheric externality;
ϕ = 5.
We obtain a similar result if there is a change in the degree in positionality
pi (for the functional specification, see Section 5). In Figure 3 we compare the
segments of fair utility allocations for two scenarios. In the first scenario indicated
by the yellow dashed line both households have the same degree of positionality,
while in the second scenario (solid blue line) household 2 is more positional than
household 1. One observes that the segment shifts upwards implying that in the
second scenario more inequality is tolerated with respect to household 1 and less
with respect to the (now) more positional household 2. The key to understand this
shift is that in scenario 2 for a marginal rise in lump sum transfers, household 2
gains more utility (from increased z consumption, and from shifting consumption
from x to z) than household 1 due to the higher importance of status consumption
for household 2 as compared to household 1. As a consequence (the absolute value)
of the slope of the Pareto frontier v1,τ1/v2,τ2 increases. That is, the investigated
changes in pi steepen the Pareto frontier, as can be seen in Figure 3. As the fairness
conditions in (29) put constraints on the (minimum- and maximum-) steepness of
the Pareto frontier, the steepening of the Pareto frontier — due to changes in pi —
then implies that the segment consistent with (29) shifts upwards.
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Figure 3. Fariness condition in second-best: variation in degree of positionality pi; ϕ = 5.
4 Optimal taxes under a non-welfarist govern-
ment
Should the government accept status effects in its welfare criterion? Concerns for
status and relative position are basically a form of jealousy and envy and one can
question whether such behavior has to be respected by the policy maker. In this
section we analyze the optimal tax policy of a government which knows that house-
holds care about status effects but which does not want to include status preferences
in the welfare criterion, i.e. the government’s and households’ preferences differ. So
far, the literature has paid almost no attention to the idea that the presence of
relative concerns in the social objective might have to be questioned. An exception
is Kanbur et al. (2006) who discuss this issue in a survey article on non-welfarist
optimal taxation.
We proceed in a similar way as before. First, we characterize the first-best
allocation from the perspective of the government and its implementation through
taxes, and then in a further step we discuss the optimal second-best tax policy of
a non-welfarist government. In order to be able to present the results in a clear
way, we assume, from now on, that status preferences enter the utility function
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additively. Preferences of households are described by the concave utility function
u˜i(xi, zi, li) +mi(ri) +
ϕ
n
n∑
j=1
(u˜j(xj, zj, lj) +mj(rj)), (30)
where ri ≡ zi/zi. We assume mr > 0 and mrr ≤ 0 for all i = 1, ..., n. The optimal
decision of a household is, again, described by conditions (4) and (5) which can also
be written as
∂u˜i/∂zi
∂u˜i/∂xi
+
1
zi
∂mi/∂ri
∂u˜i/∂xi︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ψ˜i
=
1 + tz
1 + tx
, (31)
∂u˜i/∂li
∂u˜i/∂xi
=
wi
1 + tx
. (32)
We call Ψ˜i the part of the MRS
i
zx that stems from relative consumption concerns,
that is it tells how much of good x a household is willing to give up for the better
relative position an additional unit of z provides. Note that in general Ψ˜i differs
between households.
The government knows that households base their decisions on the utility func-
tion in (30) but it behaves in a paternalistic way and ignores mi(ri) in its welfare
criterion. Let the indirect utility function of a household be given by
u˜i(z
∗
i (·), x∗i (·), l∗i (·))︸ ︷︷ ︸
v˜i(qx,qz ,τi,zi)
+mi
(
z∗i (·)
zi
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
si(qx,qz ,τi,zi)
+
ϕ
n
n∑
j=1
u˜j(z∗j (·), x∗j(·), l∗j (·))︸ ︷︷ ︸
v˜j(qx,qz ,τj ,zj)
+mj
(
z∗j (·)
zj
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
sj(qx,qz ,τj ,zj)
 .
(33)
The government considers only v˜i +
ϕ
n
∑n
j=1 v˜j in the welfare criterion. Hence, the
altruistic part of individual utility is included in the welfare criterion while the
utility part si emerging from the relative position of households will be omitted.
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4.1 Characterization of first-best allocations
We first characterize first-best allocations from the perspective of the government.
Assume again that the government can directly determine xi, zi, li for each house-
hold i. Then an efficient first-best allocation from the perspective of the government
24One implication of this is that the envelope theorem has to be used with care when taking
derivatives of v˜i. For example Roy’s identity becomes
∂v˜i
∂tz
= −zi ∂v˜i∂τi − ( ∂si∂tz + zi ∂si∂τi ).
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is a solution to the problem
max
xi,zi,li,i=1,...,n
u˜1(x1, z1, l1) +
ϕ
n
n∑
j=1
u˜j(xj, zj, lj) (34)
subject to
u˜i(xi, zi, li) +
ϕ
n
n∑
j=1
u˜j(xj, zj, lj) ≥ ui i = 2, ..., n (µ˜FBi ) (35)
n∑
i=1
xi +
n∑
i=1
zi =
n∑
i=1
wi(1− li) (λ˜FB) (36)
(37)
Observe that the government ignores the reference consumption levels and their
impact on private utility in its maximization problem. In the Appendix, we pro-
vide the first-order conditions for this problem from which the following optimality
conditions can be derived:
∂u˜i/∂zi
∂u˜i/∂xi
= 1, (38)
∂u˜i/∂li
∂u˜i/∂xi
= wi, (39)
1 + ϕ
ϕ
≥ 1
n
n∑
j=1
∂u˜i/∂xi
∂u˜j/∂xj
, (40)
for all i = 1, ..., n. From (38) and (39) it can be seen that if households had no
relative consumption concerns, the government would not want to distort their con-
sumption and leisure decision. But since households care about status consumption,
the government wants to distort the decision of households so that they behave as
if they had no status concerns. In other words, the government wants to correct for
the status preferences. In addition, similar to the welfarist case, the fairness condi-
tion given by (40) limits the set of allocations consistent with the Pareto criterion.
This fairness condition also holds in the non-welfarist case because the government
respects altruism to be part of the welfare criterion.25
In order to see which tax instruments are required to implement a first-best allo-
cation, one has to contrast conditions (38) and (39) with the optimality conditions
25In the next section, for a specified utility function, we compare the fairness condition of
a welfarist with that of a non-welfarist government. There we show that the set of allocations
considered as fair by a non-welfarist government is a strict subset of the set of allocations considered
as fair by a welfarist government.
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of a household given by (31) and (32). Similar to the welfarist case, a personal-
ized commodity tax t˜∗z,i = Ψ˜i on the status good, in addition to the personalized
lump-sum element, is required to implement a first-best allocation as a competitive
equilibrium. Only if Ψ˜i is constant across households, a uniform commodity tax
on all households would suffice. In contrast to the welfarist case, whether or not a
uniform tax on the status good suffices to implement the first-best allocation does
not depend on whether the externality is atmospheric or not. A uniform tax rate
on the status good suffices if the externality is symmetric — which implies that
zi = z — and if mr/u˜x is constant across households. A personalized commodity
tax is required in the non-welfarist case if different households are willing to give
up different amounts of x for the better relative position an additional unit of z
provides. This is the case if Ψ˜i differs across households. Note that the nature of
the externality does not affect the first-best tax rate if ∂MRSzx/∂zi = 0, as then
the household decision does not depend on zi. Proposition 4 summarizes this result.
Proposition 4 (Non-welfarist government: first-best tax structure)
(i) In general optimal commodity tax rates are given by differentiated taxes on z,
t˜∗z,i = Ψ˜i and t˜
∗
x = 0, whether or not the consumption externality is non-atmospheric.
(ii) If the externality is atmospheric and symmetric and if mr/u˜x is the same for
all households, then optimal commodity tax rates are given by a single tax on z,
t˜∗z,i = Ψ˜i = Ψ˜ = t˜
∗
z and t˜
∗
x = 0.
(iii) The nature of the consumption externality has no impact on t˜∗z and t˜
∗
x if
∂MRSzx/∂zi = 0.
(iv) The lump-sum element τ˜ ∗i is required for the efficient redistribution of resources.
Proof. See Appendix.
Loosely speaking some households care more about status than others, hence a
government which wants to correct for status preferences would want to treat these
households differently. In contrast to the previous section it is not important how
different households contribute to the reference level. Now the crucial aspect is that
some households are willing to give up more for additional status than others.
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4.2 Optimal second-best tax system
If personalized commodity taxes are not feasible, a second-best tax system, from
the perspective of the government, is a solution to the following problem:
max
tx,tz ,τi,zi,i=1,...,n
v˜1(qx, qz, τ1, z1) +
ϕ
n
n∑
j=1
v˜j(qx, qz, τj, zj) (41)
subject to
v˜i(qx, qz, τi, zi) +
ϕ
n
n∑
j=1
v˜j(qx, qz, τj, zj) ≥ vi i = 2, ..., n (µ˜sBi ) (42)
tx
n∑
i=1
xi + tz
n∑
i=1
zi ≥
n∑
i=1
τi (λ˜
SB) (43)
zi =
1
n
n∑
j=1
aijzj i = 1, ..., n (γ˜
SB
i ) (44)
The first-order conditions for this problem are provided in the Appendix. Note
that the only difference to problem (14) – (17) is the objective function in which
the status part of the utility function is now omitted. Still, v˜i is affected by the
reference level through the effect of zi on x, z, l.
26 Thus, when designing the optimal
tax system the effect of taxes on the reference levels has to be taken into account,
even though the direct impact of zi on individual utility is not considered.
From the first-order conditions of problem (41) – (44) one can derive an implicit
solution for the optimal second-best commodity taxes chosen by a non-welfarist
government.
Proposition 5 (Non-welfarist government: second-best commodity taxes)
The optimal second-best commodity taxes from the perspective of a non-welfarist
government are given by
t˜∗∗z =
1
n
(sxx
∑n
i=1
θ˜SBi
λ˜SB
1
zi
∂m
∂ri
sizz − sxz
∑n
i=1
θ˜SBi
λ˜SB
1
zi
∂m
∂ri
sizx)
szzsxx − szxsxz
+
1
n
(sxx
∑n
i=1 ˜is
i
zz − sxz
∑n
i=1 ˜is
i
zx)
szzsxx − szxsxz , (45)
26The sign of v˜z is ambiguous. In contrast to the previous section, now the government only
takes the indirect effect of zi on u˜i(x, z, l) through its effect on demand for x, z, l into account and
not the direct impact on mi(ri).
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t˜∗∗x =
1
n
(szz
∑n
i=1
θ˜SBi
λ˜SB
1
zi
∂m
∂ri
sizx − szx
∑n
i=1
θ˜SBi
λ˜SB
1
zi
∂m
∂ri
sizz)
szzsxx − szxsxz
+
1
n
(szz
∑n
i=1 ˜is
i
zx − szx
∑n
i=1 ˜is
i
zz)
szzsxx − szxsxz , (46)
where θ˜SBi ≡ µ˜SBi + ϕ/n
∑n
j=1 µ˜
SB
j and ˜i ≡ n−1
∑n
j=1(γ˜
SB
j /λ˜
SB)aji.
Proof. See Appendix.
The optimal commodity tax rates depend on two terms now. The first term can be
interpreted as the preference correcting part of the optimal tax formulas. From the
perspective of the government households consume too much of the status good and
it wants to deter individuals to purchase good z just for status reasons. Therefore,
this term is strictly positive in the case of t˜∗∗z , making the status good more expen-
sive. Note that t˜∗∗x also depends on a preference correcting part, given by the first
term on the right-hand side (46). The reason is similar to the welfarist case in which
tx is used to correct for the status externality. Due to differences across households
in their willingness to pay for additional status the government would want to tax
status consumption of each household at a different rate. Since it is restricted to
use a single rate, it is optimal to use other tax instruments to correct for status
preferences. The sign of the correction term in the case of t˜∗∗x is ambiguous.
The second term on the right hand side of (45) and (46) looks very similar to the
term determining the optimal commodity tax rates in the welfarist case. However,
its interpretation is different as ˜i differs from i. If the government has a welfarist
objective function, i basically describes the marginal welfare cost of an increase in
the externality level zi. In the case of a non-welfarist government there is no direct
welfare loss associated with an increase of zi. But since demand for x, z, l reacts
to changes in the reference levels there is an indirect effect of zi on the objective
function and on commodity tax revenues and these effects are summarized by ˜i.
Thus, when determining t˜∗∗z and t˜
∗∗
x the government has to take the effect of taxes
on the reference levels into account, even though it has no externality-correcting
motive.
Similarly to the welfarist case the optimal commodity tax structure depends
crucially on compensated price effects and on how the reference levels are formed.
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Corollary 2 (Non-welfarist government: second-best commodity tax struc-
ture - special cases)
(i) If the externality is atmospheric and symmetric and if
θ˜SBi
λ˜SB
∂mi
∂ri
= θ˜
SB
λ˜SB
∂m
∂r
for all
i ∈ N , optimal commodity tax rates are given by
t˜∗∗z = t˜
∗
z =
θ˜SB
λ˜SB
1
z
∂m
∂r
, t˜∗∗x = t˜
∗
x = 0. (47)
(ii) If sizx = 0 or s
i
zx = s
i
zz for all i ∈ N and without any restriction on the reference
levels
t˜∗∗z =
1∑n
i=1 s
i
zz
(
n∑
i=1
θ˜SBi
˜λSB
1
zi
∂m
∂ri
sizz +
n∑
i=1
˜is
i
zz
)
, t˜∗∗x = 0. (48)
Proof. See Appendix.
Case (i) refers to a scenario in which there is a unique reference level and in which
the consumption of all households is weighted equally in the formation of that
reference level. If in addition
θ˜SBi
λ˜SB
∂mi
∂ri
is the same for all households then the first-
best allocation can be implemented without personalized commodity taxes and good
x needs not to be taxed. This statement is equivalent to the one in Proposition 4 (ii).
Observe that for a welfarist government a uniform tax on the status good in addition
to the lump-sum element suffices to implement the first-best allocation as soon as the
externality is atmospheric (see Corollary 1). For a non-welfarist government more
conditions are required. This is because a non-welfarist government has to take two
aspects into account when correcting for status consumption, namely correction
of preferences and correction of the indirect effect of the reference level on social
welfare. For the former the heterogeneity in preferences among households for
status consumption matters, for the latter the heterogeneity among households in
the generation of the reference levels matters.
From case (ii) it can be seen that also in the non-welfarist case the structure of
compensated price effects has a strong impact on optimal commodity taxes. If there
are no compensated cross price effects or if the compensated cross price effects are
equal to the own compensated price effect for the status good, then good x needs
not to be taxed to correct for status preferences and the optimal tax formula on the
status good simplifies substantially (see equation (48))
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With respect to the optimal-lump sum element, a similar result to the one
provided in the welfarist case can be derived. By plugging optimal commodity
taxes into the first-order condition for τ˜i, it can be seen that τ˜
∗∗
i also serves to
correct for status preference if a uniform tax on the status good does not suffice to
fully correct for status preferences. Loosely speaking, the lump-sum element can
be used to compensate those who have no or only a very weak taste for status and
whose consumption of good z is overcorrected by the commodity taxes. From those
who have a very strong taste for status, additional correction of status consumption
can be achieved by extracting income through the lump-sum element.
Also in second-best a non-welfarist government has to take a fairness condition
into account which limits the set of allocations consistent with the Pareto crite-
rion. The reason is that the government respects altruism to be part of the utility
function. Formally the fairness condition is now given by
1 + ϕ
ϕ
≥ 1
n
n∑
j=1
∂v˜i/∂τ˜i
M˜SCi
∂v˜j/∂τ˜j
M˜SCj
(49)
for all i = 1, ..., n.27 Thus, again for an allocation to be Pareto effcient the weighted
average ratio of the marginal utility of income between household i and all other
households must not be too large.
Interestingly, the structure of an optimal tax system of a welfarist government
looks similar to that of a non-welfarist government. However, taxes are used for
different reasons in the two scenarios. In the case of a welfarist government, the main
objective is to correct for the status externalities, while a non-welfarist government
wants to correct for the status preferences of individuals. In order to be able to
make comparisons with respect to the magnitude of optimal commodity taxes in
the two scenarios and to study the quantitative impact of the reference levels on
optimal taxes we conduct some numerical simulations, which we present in the next
section.
27In the non-welfarist case we define the marginal social cost of increasing income for household
i by M˜SCi ≡ 1− tx ∂xi∂τ i − tz ∂zi∂τi + ˜i ∂zi∂τ i. For a derivation of (49), we proceed in the same way as
in the derivation of the fairness condition for the welfarist case (see Appendix).
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5 Results from Numerical Simulations
The above propositions imply the qualitative result that the nature of the con-
sumption externality does have an impact on the first-best and second-best ef-
ficient commodity tax rates both for a welfarist and for a non-welfarist welfare
criterion. Considering reasonable calibrations, three main quantitative questions
suggest themselves. First, for a given consumption externality (benchmark case),
how different are first-best and second-best efficient commodity tax rates between
the welfarist and the non-welfarist case? Second, what are the effects of the nature
of the consumption externality – whether it is atmospheric or non-atmospheric,
whether it is symmetric or asymmetric – on the first-best and second-best com-
modity tax rate of the positional good both in the welfarist and the non-welfarist
case? Third, in a second-best setting, what is the impact of the nature of the con-
sumption externality on the commodity tax rate of the non-positional good, which
is essentially zero in the first-best?
Numerical simulations, addressing these questions, are presented in the follow-
ing. The results of those simulations are not intended to suggest precise first-best or
second-best tax rates on (non-)positional goods. Rather, they are intended to pro-
vide a rough indication of how important the nature of the consumption externality
for efficient tax rates – under a reasonable calibration – is. Therefore, the numer-
ical simulations focus on the change of efficient tax rates due to the consumption
externality rather than on the levels of efficient tax rates.
We employ a simple specified model with two types of households, 1 and 2.
There are n households. A share of η is of type 1, and a share of (1 − η) is of
type 2. Household types differ with respect to three attributes: preferences, labor
productivity, and (possibly) externality coefficients aij. Every household is endowed
with one unit of time. A household of type i receives a wage rate of wi per unit of
labor supplied. Preferences are represented by the following utility functions.
ui(xi, zi, li, z¯i) = αi lnxi + βi ln
[
zi
(
zi
z¯i
)pi]
+ γi ln li , i = 1, 2 , (50)
where z¯i ≡ η ai1z1 + η ai2z2. Notice that these utility functions satisfy the sepa-
rability requirement of the non-welfarist case. Preference parameter pi represents
the strength of “positionality.” If pi = 0, the consumption reference level does not
affect type i’s behavior. However, the higher is pi, the stronger is the impact of z¯i on
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household type i’s behavior. Johansson-Stenman et al. (2002) refer to [pi/(1 + pi)]
as the marginal degree of positionality.
What we call baseline values of the background parameters is listed in Table
1. Unless stated otherwise, tables and graphs are based on these parameter values
that imply standard stylized facts, as discussed below.
TABLE 1
Baseline values of background parameters
Households Type 1 Type 2 (“rich”)
Preference parameters αi 1/3 1/4
βi 5/12 5/12
γi 1/4 1/3
pi 1/5 2/5
Productivity wi 2 4
Externality parameters a1i 4/5 9/5
a2i 3/5 13/5
Share parameter ηi 4/5 1/5
Utility ui endogenous -7/20
Note. Notice that η1ai1 + η2ai2 = 1.
With this parameterization, households of type 2 are considered significantly wealth-
ier than households of type 1 (w2 > w1). Consistent with empirical evidence, those
households have a stronger impact on the consumption reference levels than type
1-households ( ai2 > ai1). Roughly, households of type 2 are rich and they are the
primary externality generators. These households are typically a small group within
an economy. Therefore, we give this group just a small weight ((1− η) = 1/5).
Regarding the degree of positionality, we consider “rich” households as at least
as positional as other households. Specifically, 2/5 = p2 > p1 = 1/5. Empirical
studies, including Alvarez-Cuadrado et al. (2012), Maurer et al. (2008), Ravina
(2007), or Wendner and Goulder (2008) demonstrate that the marginal degree of
positionality falls into the range [0.2, 0.4]. Converting this range into a range for
our pi yields pi ∈ [0.25, 0.67]. In our study we are quite conservative and consider
the low end of pi = 0.2, and the high end of pi = 0.4 (see Table 1).
Minimum utility of household type 2 is chosen to amount to a value of -0.35. As
w2 > w1, this value is somewhat higher than the endogenous value of u1. Given this
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parameterization, we fix the values of the other preference parameters (αi, βi, γi)
so that households choose an employment share in between (0.6, 0.75), that is,
li ∈ (0.25, 0.4). Close to no empirical evidence exists for the coefficients aij. There-
fore, most numerical simulations deal with the sensitivity of efficient tax rates with
respect to aij. We are now ready to turn to our first question.
5.1 Welfarist versus non-welfarist tax rates
For the consumption externality as given by the baseline values (Table 1), how
different are first-best and second-best efficient commodity tax rates between the
welfarist and the non-welfarist case?
TABLE 2
Welfarist versus Non-welfarist Tax Rates (baseline values)
FB welfarist SB welfarist FB non-welfarist SB non-welfarist
tz,1, tz,2 0.17, 0.50 0.26 0.20, 0.40 0.26
tx 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.007
τ1, τ2 0.35, -0.14 0.45, -0.44 0.36, -0.17 0.41, -0.33
u1 -0.47 -0.48 -0.47 -0.47
x1, x2 0.72, 0.83 0.74, 0.75 0.73, 0.82 0.74, 0.78
z1, z2 0.93, 1.28 0.90, 1.41 0.91, 1.37 0.88, 1.46
z¯1, z¯2 1.06, 1.11 1.08, 1.17 1.07, 1.15 1.09, 1.18
l1, l2 0.27, 0.28 0.28, 0.25 0.27, 0.27 0.28, 0.26
Note. FB = first-best, SB = second-best. In SB, a unique value for tz is given, as tz1 = tz2.
Table 2 suggests three main results. First, in the first-best, the efficient tax rate
on the positional good is vastly sensitive with respect to a household’s strength of
externality generation. For the baseline calibration, household type 2 is the primary
generator of the consumption externality (ai2 > ai1, i = 1, 2). In the welfarist (non-
welfarist) case, tz,2 is three times (twice) as large as tz,1. Second, in the second-best,
the efficient tax on the non-positional good is different from zero, but quite small
as compared to tz. In the welfarist (non-welfarist) case, tx = 1.4% ( tx = 0.7%).
That is, from a corrective point of view, positional and non-positional commodities
need to be taxed highly differently. Third, the above observations hold for both
the welfarist and the non-welfarist case. In the latter, however, (most) commodity
tax rates are significantly smaller than in the former. Intuitively, a non-welfarist
government — by not taking into account the positionality term, mi(ri), in its
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welfare criterion — does not need to correct for the direct effect of the consumption
externality on welfare. In the first-best, therefore, the tax rates on the positional
good tend to be lower and less different from each other than in the welfarist case.
The less different the tz,i are in the first-best, the better a uniform tz in second-best
is able to mimic the first-best tax regime, thus, the lower is tx in the second-best.
As seen in Table 2, in the non-welfarist case the tax rate tx comes down to only
half the value it amounts to in the welfarist case.
5.2 Welfarist versus non-welfarist tax rates and the nature
of the consumption externality
This subsection considers the effects of the nature of the consumption externality
on the first-best and second-best commodity tax rates of the positional good both
in the welfarist and the non-welfarist case.
5.2.1 Efficient taxation in the first-best
In Table 3 below, by systematically varying coefficients aij, we identify the effects on
efficient commodity tax rates of the consumption externality being non-atmospheric
rather than atmospheric as well as being asymmetric rather than symmetric. Specif-
ically, Panel A considers an atmospheric and symmetric consumption externality
(aij = 1). Panel B takes up a non-atmospheric and symmetric consumption ex-
ternality. Comparing Panels A and B allows some inference of the impact of the
consumption externality being non-atmospheric rather than atmospheric on effi-
cient taxation. Panels C.1 and C.2 investigate a non-atmospheric and asymmetric
consumption externality. Comparing Panels B and C allows some assessment of the
effects of the consumption externality being asymmetric rather than symmetric.
Table 3 offers several insights. Here we focus on the first-best tax regimes, for
which tx = 0. In the following subsection, we focus on the second-best tax regimes.
In order to sharpen the differences between the welfarist and the non-welfarist case,
preferences (50) are chosen such that only direct effects — effects via the welfare
criterion — are caused by z¯i.
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28 In other words, in the optimum, (xi, zi, li) are affected by pi but not by z¯i. Thus, in the
non-welfarist case, individual behavior is independent of the composition of z¯i. As the welfare
criterion is independent of z¯i too, the efficient non-welfarist tax regimes are identical across Panels
A to C.2. In contrast, in the welfarist case, the welfare criterion does depend on z¯i. Thus, the
efficient welfarist tax regime also depends on the composition of z¯i.
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To begin with, consider the first column, labeled “FB welfarist”, of Table 3. It
is evident that the nature of the consumption externality does have a major impact
on the first-best efficient tax rates of the positional good. In particular — in the
welfarist case — tz,i is identical across individuals as long as the consumption ex-
ternality is atmospheric. Once it becomes non-atmospheric, tz,i vary greatly across
household types, no matter whether the externality is asymmetric or not, as seen
from comparing Panel A with Panels B , C.1, and C.2.
TABLE 3
Effects of the Nature of the Consumption Externality
FB welfarist SB welfarist FB non-welfarist SB non-welfarist
Panel A
a11 = 1, a12 = 1
a21 = 1, a22 = 1
tz,1, tz,2 0.25, 0.25 0.25 0.20, 0.40 0.26
tx 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.007
τ1, τ2 0.45, -0.54 0.45, -0.54 0.36, -0.17 0.41, -0.33
Panel B
a11 = 0.6, a12 = 2.6
a21 = 0.6, a22 = 2.6
tz,1, tz,2 0.14, 0.61 0.26 0.20, 0.40 0.26
tx 0.000 0.019 0.000 0.007
τ1, τ2 0.33, -0.02 0.45, -0.43 0.36, -0.17 0.41, -0.33
Panel C.1
a11 = 0.6, a12 = 2.6
a21 = 0.4, a22 = 3.4
tz,1, tz,2 0.12, 0.69 0.27 0.20, 0.40 0.26
tx 0.000 0.023 0.000 0.007
τ1, τ2 0.30, 0.10 0.45, -0.38 0.36, -0.17 0.41, -0.33
Panel C.2
a11 = 0.6, a12 = 2.6
a21 = 0.8, a22 = 1.8
tz,1, tz,2 0.16, 0.53 0.26 0.20, 0.40 0.26
tx 0.000 0.015 0.000 0.007
τ1, τ2 0.35, -0.14 0.46, -0.47 0.36, -0.17 0.41, -0.33
Note. FB = first-best, SB = second-best. Except for aij , background parameters assume the
baseline values.
Panels C depict situations in which type 2 households have a much stronger im-
pact on the build up of the consumption reference level than households of type 1,
that is, the externality is non-atmospheric. However, this effect is significantly more
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(significantly less) pronounced for type 2-households than for type 1-households in
Panel C.1 (Panel C.2). That is, the consumption externalities are also asymmetric.
The asymmetry effect may either strengthen or weaken the above result. Partic-
ularly, in Panel C.1, the primary externality generating type has a comparatively
higher impact on its own type 2 than on the less positional type 1 (a22 > a12).
Consequently, tz,i vary by more across household types than in case of a symmetric
consumption externality. In Panel C.2, the primary externality generating type has
a comparatively lower impact on its own type 2 than on the less positional type 1
(a22 < a12), with the consequence that the tz,i vary by less across household types
than in case of a symmetric externality.
Next, consider the third column of Table 3, labeled “FB non-welfarist.” Here,
the tax rates on the positional good vary across households even for an atmospheric
and symmetric consumption externality. In the non-welfarist case, the variation is
not driven by the consumption reference levels (see Footnote 28) but by the strength
of positionality, pi. Considering the baseline values of the parameters, p2 = 2 p1,
which — for the given preferences (50) — translates in household type 2 facing a
tax rate twice as high as that of household type 1.
5.2.2 Efficient taxation in the second-best
The second-best results are probably of greater policy relevance than first-best
tax rates. Table 3 evokes the following three insights. While the nature of the
consumption externality vastly influences first-best efficient tax rates, it has only a
minimal impact on second-best tax rates. This holds for both the tax rates on the
positional good as well as the tax rates on the non-positional good. Although the
unique second-best tax rate on the positional good mimics the first-best tax regime
very incompletely only, the second-best tax rate on the non-positional good — not
exceeding 2.3% — is quite low in all cases. Finally, while first-best efficient tax
rates in the welfarist- and the non-welfarist cases are quite different, the respective
second-best tax regimes are remarkably close to each other.
The results inferred from the above tables hold for a considerably wider set of
parameter values. Sensitivity analysis with respect to pi and further patterns of
aij (including special cases addressed in Section 3.1) are available from the authors
upon request.
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5.2.3 The fairness condition under a (non-) welfarist government
In Section 3.3, we argue that the fairness condition rules out efficient allocations
that are “too” different in terms of marginal utilities of income. Does the fair-
ness condition under a welfarist optimality criterion rule out other allocations com-
pared to a non-welfarist criterion? Numerical simulations suggest an affirmative
answer.29 Under a non-welfarist criterion, the fairness condition systematically
rules out efficient allocations that are not ruled out under a welfarist welfare crite-
rion.30 Non-welfarism shrinks the set of fair utility allocations. Phrased differently,
a non-welfarist government acts more egalitarian than a welfarist government.
In Figure 4, all parameters except for pi assume their baseline values. The
strengths of positionality are higher here (p1 = 1/2, p2 = 4/5) in order to make
the differences between the welfarist- and the non-welfarist case better visible. In
(u1, u2) space, the figure shows the utility possibility frontiers. The thick (thin)
frontier refers to the welfarist (non-welfarist) case. Along the line labeled “egalitar-
ian allocations,” u1 = u2 holds. In Figure 4, the altruism parameter is chosen to be
ϕ = 5.
j=5
j=5
W
W
NW
NW
egalitarian
allocations
non-welfarist
welfarist
-1.4 -1.2 -1.0 -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2
u1
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
u2
Figure 4. First-best: Fair allocations under welfarist and non-welfarist welfare criteria; ϕ = 5,
p1 = 2/5, p2 = 4/5.
29A series of further simulations concerning the fairness condition is available from the authors
upon request.
30This is a rough statement, though, as different allocations are efficient under the two welfare
criteria. The following figure, however, should clarify this statement.
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The thin non-welfarist utility possibility frontier is weakly below the thick wel-
farist frontier. For both welfare criteria, governments respect individual preferences.
However, for the non-welfarist criterion, the government does not take the direct
externality part, mi(zi/z¯i), into account.
Dots {W,W} indicate the boundaries of the welfarist fair utility allocations,
while dots {NW,NW} indicate the boundaries of the non-welfarist fair utility
allocations. As argued above, the fairness condition puts a limit on the marginal
utilities of income, or equivalently, on the slopes of the utility possibility frontiers.
At {W,NW} as well as at {W,NW} the slopes of the utility possibility frontiers
are identical.
As seen in Figure 4, non-welfarism “shrinks” the set of fair utility allocations.
A number of utility allocations that are fair under a welfarist welfare criterion are
not considered fair under a non-welfarist welfare criterion. To gain intuition to the
“shrinking” of the set of fair allocations, think about the elasticity of v˜2 with respect
to dτ1. The elasticity is higher in the welfarist case than in the non-welfarist case.
The reason is that a non-welfarist government (in contrast to a welfarist govern-
ment) does not take into account the additional change in utility, gained (lost) by
type 2 from an increase (from a decrease) of the consumption of the positional good,
due to the rise (a decline) of the lump sum transfer dτ1. In other words, the utility
possibility frontier is flatter (less curved) under a welfarist criterion than under a
non-welfarist criterion. So, more utility allocations are compatible with the fairness
condition under a welfarist criterion as compared to a non-welfarist criterion. As a
consequence, the fairness condition requires a non-welfarist government to act more
egalitarian than a welfarist government.
6 Conclusions
This paper addresses the effects of non-atmospheric and asymmetric consumption
externalities on efficient commodity taxes. The analysis is motivated by the fact
that a KUJ-externality typically involves substantial preference-heterogeneities. In
addition to being status conscious households are assumed to be altruistic in our
framework. That is, households care about their relative position in society but, at
the same time, they dislike income inequality. The analysis is conducted both from
the perspective of a welfarist and a non-welfarist government. The reason is that it
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is questionable whether or not status preferences, which are a form of envy, should
be respected by the policy maker.
We find that the nature of the consumption externality has a strong impact on
efficient first-best commodity taxes in the welfarist case. Even if a personalized
lump-sum element is available, personalized commodity taxes are required to im-
plement a first-best allocation, given the externality is non-atmospheric. Numerical
simulations suggest that first-best tax rates in the welfarist case are highly sensitive
to the specific nature of the consumption externality. In the non-welfarist case,
personalized commodity taxes (in addition to personalized lump-sum taxes) are re-
quired to achieve a first-best allocation if, loosely speaking, some households are
more status conscious than others. This implies that the nature of the consumption
externality affects first-best tax rates only if the reference level has an impact on
how much households are willing to give up in terms of additional status. This is
the case if the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and the positional good
changes with the reference level.31
Since personalized commodity taxes are hardly a feasible policy instrument we
also study efficient tax programs when commodity taxes are restricted to be uniform
across households. The nature of the consumption externality affects the efficient
tax structure in the welfarist case insofar as the whole tax system (all commodity-
and lump sum taxes) are required to correct for the externality as soon as per-
sonalized commodity taxes are not available. However, our numerical simulations
suggest that quantitatively these effects are only of minor relevance. Also in the
non-welfarist case the whole tax system is required to correct for status prefer-
ence if personalized commodity taxes are not available, but again, in the numerical
simulations it turns out that these effects are small.
Perhaps surprisingly, the structures of efficient commodity tax programs of both
a welfarist and a non-welfarist government are similar. Still, the motive for the
taxation of status consumption is very different in the two scenarios. A welfarist
government wants to tax status consumption in order to correct for a consumption
externality. From the perspective of a non-welfarist government this consumption
externality does not exist. Its motive for taxing status consumption is to correct
31In the section on numerical simulations we consider preferences where ∂MRSzx/∂zi = 0,
which explains why there is no effect of the nature of the consumption externality on the simulation
results in the non-welfarist case.
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for status preferences, that is, its goal is to design a tax system which induces
households to behave as if they had no status concerns. Our numerical simulations
suggest that not only the qualitative structure of efficient tax programs is similar
but also quantitatively efficient tax rates are surprisingly similar in the two cases.
The presence of genuine altruism has no impact on the structure of efficient com-
modity tax programs. However, it gives rise to a fairness condition which requires
the distribution of utility not to be too unequal. The nature of the consumption
externality has a strong impact on the set of allocations considered as fair. For ex-
ample, in the welfarist case more inequality is tolerated towards households whose
status consumption is particularly harmful. Further, we show that, everything else
equal, the set of allocations considered as fair by a non-welfarist government is
smaller than that considered as fair by a welfarist government, i.e. less inequality
is tolerated if the government is non-welfarist. This might explain, to some extent,
why governments acting rather in a non-welfarist way, such as those in Scandina-
vian countries, are more egalitarian, than those acting more in a welfarist way (as
for example in the USA).
There are several interesting ways to extend the contribution of this paper.
First, the weights aij are assumed to be exogenous in this paper. A major further
step consists in developing a theory that endogenizes these weights and develops
a mechanism explaining how individuals form their reference groups and reference
levels. Second, although redistribution is part of our model, its impact on the
tax structure is limited since we allow for personalized lump-sum taxes. A further
step could be to analyze efficient tax programs in the current context if the lump-
sum element is restricted to be uniform. This might have a strong impact on
the relationship between the fairness condition and the tax system. Third, besides
genuine altruism considered in our paper, there exists other forms of altruism such as
pure or paternalistic altruism (see, e.g., Johansson 1997). An interesting further step
consists in studying the impact of other forms of altruism on efficient tax programs.
Notwithstanding these limitations, we hope this study clarifies the impact of status
effects on optimal commodity taxation and is able to contribute to future discussions
of tax reform.
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Appendix
Characterization of first-best allocations in the welfarist case
The Lagrangian for the maximization problem (7)-(10) reads
L =
n∑
i=1
θFBi ui(xi, zi, li, zi)−
n∑
i=2
µFBi ui + λ
FB(
n∑
i=1
wi(1− li)−
n∑
i=1
xi −
n∑
i=1
zi)
+
n∑
i=1
γFBi (zi −
1
n
n∑
j=1
aijzj). (51)
with θFBi ≡ µFBi + ϕn
∑n
j=1 µ
FB
j and µ
FB
1 ≡ 1. The first-order conditions with respect
to xi, zi, li and zi are given by
θFBi
∂ui
∂xi
− λFB = 0 (52)
θFBi
∂ui
∂zi
− λFB − 1
n
n∑
j=1
γFBj aji = 0 (53)
θFBi
∂ui
∂li
− λFBwi = 0 (54)
θFBi
∂ui
∂zi
+ γFBi = 0 (55)
for i = 1, ..., n. Combining (53) and (52) yields equation (11) in the text and
combing (52) and (54) yields equation (12) in the text.
The fairness condition in (13) can be derived as follows. From the definition for
θFBi it follows that
µFBi = θ
FB
i −
ϕ
n
n∑
j=1
µFBj , (56)
and hence
∑n
i=1 µ
FB
i =
1
1+ϕ
∑n
i=1 θ
FB
i . Plug in for
∑n
i=1 µ
FB
i in (56) to get µ
FB
i =
θFBi − ϕ(1+ϕ)n
∑n
j=1 θ
FB
j . Then the nonegativity of µ
FB
i togeter with (52) to substi-
tute for θFBi yields the fairness condition given by (13).
Proof of Proposition 1
(i) From Definition 1 we know that an externality is atmospheric if aji = aji′ for all
39
j, i, i′ ∈ N , whether or not the externality is asymmetric. This implies that then
Ψi = Ψi′ for all i, i
′ ∈ N . Combining the optimality condition of the households
((4)and (5)) with those of the government ((11) and (12)) shows that households
choose the optimal consumption bundle if t∗z = Ψ and t
∗
x = 0.
(ii) From Definition 1 it follows that Ψi 6= Ψi′ for some i, i′ ∈ N if the externality
is non-atmospheric. This implies that personalized commodity taxes tz,i = Ψi are
requird to induce households to choose the optimal consumption bundle.
(iii) Households differ in preferences and wages. The lump-sum element τi is adapted
such that (11)-(13) hold, given that t∗z, t
∗
x are set optimally.
First-order condition for problem (14)-(17)
The Lagrangian for the maximization problem (14)-(17) reads
L =
n∑
i=1
θSBi vi(qx, qz, τi, zi)−
n∑
i=2
µSBi vi + λ
SB(tx
n∑
i=1
xi + tz
n∑
i=1
zi −
n∑
i=1
τi)
+
n∑
i=1
γSBi (zi −
1
n
n∑
j=1
aijzj). (57)
The first-order conditions with respect to tx, tz, τi and zi are given by
n∑
i=1
θSBi
∂vi
∂tx
+ λSB(
n∑
i=1
xi + tx
n∑
i=1
∂xi
∂tx
+ tz
n∑
i=1
∂zi
∂tx
)− 1
n
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
γSBi aij
∂zj
∂tx
= 0 (58)
n∑
i=1
θSBi
∂vi
∂tz
+ λSB(
n∑
i=1
zi + tx
n∑
i=1
∂xi
∂tz
+ tz
n∑
i=1
∂zi
∂tz
)− 1
n
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
γSBi aij
∂zj
∂tz
= 0 (59)
θSBi
∂vi
∂τi
+ λSB(tx
∂xi
∂τi
+ tz
∂zi
∂τi
)− λSB − 1
n
n∑
j=1
γSBj aji
∂zi
∂τi
= 0 (60)
θSBi
∂vi
∂zi
+ λSB(tx
∂xi
∂zi
+ tz
∂zi
∂zi
) + γSBi −
1
n
n∑
j=1
γSBj aji
∂zi
∂zi
= 0 (61)
with θSBi ≡ µSBi + ϕn
∑n
j=1 µ
SB
j and µ
SB
1 ≡ 1.
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Derivation of optimal commodity taxes in second best: welfarist case
Take the first-order condition (59) for tz, plug in for
∂vi
∂tz
= −zi ∂vi∂τi and use the
definition for the net social marginal utility bi ≡ θ
SB
i
λSB
∂vi
∂τi
+ tx
∂xi
∂τi
+ tz
∂zi
∂τi
− i ∂zi∂τi to get
−
n∑
i=1
bizi +
n∑
i=1
zi + tx
n∑
i=1
(
∂xi
∂tz
+ zi
∂xi
∂τi
) + tz
n∑
i=1
(
∂zi
∂tz
+ zi
∂zi
∂τi
)
−
n∑
i=1
i(
∂zi
∂tz
+ zi
∂zi
∂τi
) = 0. (62)
Now, make use of the Slutsky decomposition sizz =
∂zi
∂tz
+ zi
∂zi
∂τi
and sixz =
∂xi
∂tz
+ zi
∂xi
∂τi
and of the definition for the covariance φ(b, z) = 1
n
∑n
i=1 bizi − bz to get
−bz + z − φ(b, z) = − 1
n
tx
n∑
i=1
sixz −
1
n
tz
n∑
i=1
sizz +
1
n
n∑
i=1
is
i
zz. (63)
Divide (63) by the average consumption of the status good z and rearrange terms
to get the first part of the many-person Ramsey rule
1− b− φ(b, z)
z
=
−txsxz − tzszz + 1n
∑n
i=1 is
i
zz
z
. (64)
Take the first-order condition (58) for tx and proceed in the same way to get the
second part of the many-person Ramsey rule
1− b− φ(b, x)
x
=
−txsxx − tzszx + 1n
∑n
i=1 is
i
zx
x
. (65)
With personalized lump-sum taxes available, the left-hand sides of (64) and (65)
become zero as bi = b = 1, which follows from (60), and because the covariance
φ(b, k) = 0 with k = {z, x}, as the covariance of a variable with a constant is always
zero. After rearranging terms equations, (64) and (65) can be written in matrix
form as given in (19) in the text.
Proof of Proposition 2
Apply Cramer’s rule to equation (19) to get (20) and (21). t∗∗z > 0 is implied by
i > 0 together with the assumption that the 2x2 sub-Slutsky matrix of the taxed
goods is non-singular and negative semidefinite.
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Derivation of fairness condition in second-best
From the definition for θSBi it follows that
µSBi = θ
SB
i −
ϕ
n
n∑
j=1
µSBj , (66)
and hence
∑n
i=1 µ
SB
i =
1
1+ϕ
∑n
i=1 θ
SB
i . Plug in for
∑n
i=1 µ
FB
i in (66) to get µ
SB
i =
θSBi − ϕ(1+ϕ)n
∑n
j=1 θ
SB
j . Then the nonegativity of µ
SB
i togeter with (60) to substitute
for θSBi yields the fairness condition given by (29).
Characterization of first-best allocations in the non-welfarist case
The Lagrangian for the maximization problem (34)-(37) reads
L =
n∑
i=1
θ˜FBi u˜i(xi, zi, li)−
n∑
i=2
µ˜FBi ui + λ˜
FB(
n∑
i=1
wi(1− li)−
n∑
i=1
xi −
n∑
i=1
zi), (67)
with θ˜FBi ≡ µ˜FBi + ϕn
∑n
j=1 µ˜
FB
j and µ˜
FB
1 ≡ 1. The first-order conditions with respect
to xi, zi, li are given by
θ˜FBi
∂ui
∂xi
− λ˜FB = 0 (68)
θ˜FBi
∂ui
∂zi
− λ˜FB = 0 (69)
θ˜FBi
∂ui
∂li
− λ˜FBwi = 0 (70)
for i = 1, ..., n. Combining (69) and (68) yields equation (38) in the text and comb-
ing (68) and (70) yields equation (39) in the text. The fairness condition in (40)
can be derived in the same way as the one in the welfarist case.
Proof of Proposition 4
(i) Since households differ in preferences and wages they are in general willing to
give up different amounts of good x for the better relative position an additional
unit of good z provides, i.e. Ψi 6= Ψi′ for some i, i′ ∈ N no matter whether the exter-
nality is atmospheric or not. Combining the optimality condition of the households
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((31)and (32)) with those of the government ((38) and (39)) shows that households
choose the optimal consumption bundle if t˜iz∗ = Ψ˜i and t˜∗x = 0.
(ii) If the externality is symmetric and mr/u˜x is the same for all households, then
Ψ˜i = Ψ˜i′ for all i, i
′ ∈ N . Combining the optimality condition of the households
((31)and (32)) with those of the government ((38) and (39)) shows that households
choose the optimal consumption bundle if t˜∗z = Ψ˜ and t˜
∗
x = 0. However, a uniform
tax on the status good is only sufficient to implement a first-best allocation if in ad-
dition the externality is atmospheric. As soon as the externality is non-atmospheric
a personalized commodity tax is required to implement a first-best allocation even
if the externality is symmetric and mr/u˜x is the same for all households. The reason
is that then the indirect effect of the reference level on social welfare (which is zero
in first best) can not be fully internalized.
(iii) If ∂MRSzx/∂zi = 0 then the correction term Ψ˜i is independent of zi.
(iv) Households differ in preferences and wages. The lump-sum element τi is adapted
such that (11)-(13) hold, given that t˜∗z, t˜
∗
x are set optimally.
First-order condition for problem (41)-(44)
The Lagrangian for the maximization problem (41)-(44) reads
L =
n∑
i=1
θ˜SBi v˜i(qx, qz, τi, zi)−
n∑
i=2
µ˜SBi vi + λ˜
SB(tx
n∑
i=1
xi + tz
n∑
i=1
zi −
n∑
i=1
τi)
+
n∑
i=1
γ˜SBi (zi −
1
n
n∑
j=1
aijzj). (71)
The first-order conditions with respect to tx, tz, τi and zi are given by
n∑
i=1
θ˜SBi
∂v˜i
∂tx
+ λ˜SB(
n∑
i=1
xi + tx
n∑
i=1
∂xi
∂tx
+ tz
n∑
i=1
∂zi
∂tx
)− 1
n
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
γ˜SBi aij
∂zj
∂tx
= 0 (72)
n∑
i=1
θ˜SBi
∂v˜i
∂tz
+ λ˜SB(
n∑
i=1
zi + tx
n∑
i=1
∂xi
∂tz
+ tz
n∑
i=1
∂zi
∂tz
)− 1
n
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
γ˜SBi aij
∂zj
∂tz
= 0 (73)
θ˜SBi
∂v˜i
∂τi
+ λ˜SB(tx
∂xi
∂τi
+ tz
∂zi
∂τi
)− λ˜SB − 1
n
n∑
j=1
γ˜SBj aji
∂zi
∂τi
= 0 (74)
θ˜SBi
∂v˜i
∂zi
+ λ˜SB(tx
∂xi
∂zi
+ tz
∂zi
∂zi
) + γ˜SBi −
1
n
n∑
j=1
γ˜SBj aji
∂zi
∂zi
= 0 (75)
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with θ˜SBi ≡ µ˜SBi + ϕn
∑n
j=1 µ˜
SB
j and µ˜
SB
1 ≡ 1.
Proof of Proposition 5
Take (73) and plug in for Roy’s identity ∂v˜i
∂tz
= −zi ∂v˜i∂τi − (∂si∂tz + zi ∂si∂τi ) to get
λ˜SB(
n∑
i=1
zi + tx
n∑
i=1
∂xi
∂tz
+ tz
n∑
i=1
∂zi
∂tz
) =
n∑
i=1
θ˜SBi
∂v˜i
∂τi
zi +
n∑
i=1
θ˜SBi (
∂si
∂tz
+ zi
∂si
∂τi
)
+
1
n
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
γ˜iaij
∂zj
∂tz
(76)
Next, take (74) and multiply it with zi. Then plug in for θ˜
SB
i
∂v˜i
∂τi
zi from (74) into
(76) and use the Slutsky decomposition sizz =
∂zi
∂tz
+ zi
∂zi
∂τi
and sixz =
∂xi
∂tz
+ zi
∂xi
∂τi
to
get
tx
n∑
i=1
sixz + tz
n∑
i=1
sizz =
n∑
i=1
θ˜SBi
λ˜SB
(
∂si
∂tz
+ zi
∂si
∂τi
) +
1
n
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
γ˜SBi
λ˜SB
ajis
i
zz (77)
Apply the same steps to the first order condition for tx given by (72) to get
tx
n∑
i=1
sixx + tz
n∑
i=1
sizx =
n∑
i=1
θ˜SBi
λ˜SB
(
∂si
∂tx
+ xi
∂si
∂τi
) +
1
n
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
γ˜SBi
λ˜SB
ajis
i
zx. (78)
Finally, apply Cramer’s rule to the system of equations given by (77) and (78) and
substitute for ( ∂si
∂tk
+ ki
∂si
∂τi
) = 1
zi
∂mi
∂ri
szk with k = x, z to get (45) and (46).
Proof of Corollary 2
(i) It follows from (45) and (46) that t∗∗z =
θ˜SB
λ˜SB
1
z
∂m
∂r
+ ˜i and t
∗∗
x = 0 if the externality
is atmospheric and symmetric and if
θ˜SBi
λ˜SB
∂mi
∂ri
= θ˜
SB
λ˜SB
∂m
∂r
for all i ∈ N . To see that in
this case ˜i = ˜ = 0 for all i ∈ N in the optimum, take the first order condition for
zi given by (75) which can also be written as
γ˜SBi
λ˜SB
= − θ˜
SB
i
λ˜SB
∂v˜i
∂zi
− tx∂xi
∂zi
− tz ∂zi
∂zi
+ ˜i
∂zi
∂zi
. (79)
Use ∂v˜i
∂zi
= − 1
zi
∂mi
∂ri
∂zi
∂zi
and plug in for t∗∗z and t
∗∗
x as given above. Then one can see
that γ˜SBi = 0 for all i ∈ N , and consequently ˜i = ˜ = 0 in the optimum. This
implies that under the condition in Corollary (i) optimal commodity tax rates are
given by (47).
(ii) Follows immediately from (45) and (46).
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